“The trouble with programmers is that you can never tell what a programmer is doing until it’s too late.”

– Seymour Cray
Security Mitigation & Validation

Anti-Patterns for security mitigation & validation
- Poorly considered password policy
- Poorly considered privilege management
- Assuming firewall or air gap is perfect security
- No implementing secure update + secure boot
- Just relying on penetration testing

Mitigation best practices
- Keep up to date with good security practices
- Secure update + secure boot
- Penetration testing is only a starting point
Principle: Password Strength

- **Typical failure scenarios**
  - Same password used by everyone
  - Weak passwords ("1234")
  - Strong password policy ➔ post-it note work-around

- **Possible solutions**
  - Different password per person with reasonable strength
  - Two-factor authentication (e.g., RFID transponder)

- **Balance between usability & security**
  - Can you memorize: 7R#Ve9j3e@ahi7gjHr(*\pW4!X?
  - 2017 NIST guidelines (https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/)
    - Good ideas: long size, hash/salt/stretch for storage
    - Avoid: words in dictionary, requiring weird characters, password hints, timed expiry
    - Avoid SMS for 2fa (!) due to phone number hijacking (at least in some countries)
Storing Passwords

- Don’t store them as plain text!
  - Don’t just encrypt them either

- Hash:
  - Store a digest of password
  - But, dictionary attacks are a problem
  - Rainbow table: precomputed hashes

- Salting & pepper:
  - Salt: random extra text
  - Pepper: systematic extra text
  - Can be secret or public (tradeoffs)

- Generically, key stretching:
  - E.g., PBKDF2 stretching
  - Use up to date techniques!

![Image: Hackers recently leaked 153 million Adobe user emails, encrypted passwords, and password hints. Adobe encrypted the passwords improperly, misusing block-mode 3DES. The result is something wonderful.](https://xkcd.com/1286/)

Permanent link to this comic: https://xkcd.com/1286/
Rubber Hose Attack

A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED. LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.

NO GOOD! IT'S 4096-BIT RSA!

BLAST! OUR EVIL PLAN IS FOILED!

WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED. DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH THIS $5 WRENCH UNTIL HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.

GOT IT.
**Principle: Least Privilege**

- Each user & task should only have as much capability as it needs
  - Commonly, “user,” “administrator,” “factory”
  - Better: per-user fine-gain bit map of function permission
  - Related: helpful to log who did what (forensics)

- Common mistakes
  - Make a common task high privilege
    - Everyone used to log in as admin for Windows
  - Give everyone the same password
    - Once someone has admin, can’t roll them back
  - Make risky operations too easy (no confirmation)

- In general, think through permissions
  - Customers may push back, but this is important
What Happens With Unsigned Updates

**Infotainment-to-CAN Firewall**

- CPU non-secured update
- Attackers reflashed firewall to access CAN

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**Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It**

I was driving 70 mph on the edge of downtown St. Louis when the exploit began to take hold.

Though I hadn’t touched the dashboard, the vents in the Jeep Cherokee started blasting cold air at the maximum setting, shivering the sweat on my back through the in-seat climate control system. Next the radio switched to the local hip hop station and began blaring skew-lob full volume. I spun the control knob left and hit the power button, to no avail. Then the windshield wipers turned on, and wiper fluid flooded the glass.

As I tried to cope with all this, a picture of the two hackers performing these stunts appeared on the car’s digital display. Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek, wearing their trademark trade suits. A nice touch, I thought.

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**Latest News**

Secure Update

- You’ll need to deploy security patches
  - Your code might have a vulnerability
  - 3rd party code (library, OS, communications) might be vulnerable

- Secure update good practices:
  - Bootloader that does updates
    - First stage: integrity check for 2nd stage; can’t be changed(!)
    - Second stage: knows how to load application image
  - Bootloader checks image public key signature
    - Public key hard-coded into bootloader
    - Only properly signed images are loaded
    - Consider limited date ranges (key revocation is hard)
      - E.g., pre-deploy public key every 3 months for 20 years
    - Consider hard-coding repository IP addresses

Example Mitigation: Secure Boot

- If your firmware is compromised, you are insecure
  - Need a way to make sure you only run factory-authorized code
  - Use public key signature to check firmware image integrity
    - Note: symmetric hash exposes signing key to attack

Figure 24. Code- and Document-Signing Process

Figure 25. Code- and Document-Signing Verification Process

https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/air_software/media/AR-08-31.pdf
Misconception: “Encryption Equals Security”
- Encryption provides secrecy – but you might need integrity!
- Encryption invokes export controls
- What are the actual security requirements?

Example for firmware distribution
- Public key encryption of firmware is infeasible
  - Need a different binary image for every device!
  - On-line copy vulnerable to attack
  - Reverse engineering will recover firmware image if bad guys want it
- Secure signature (Public Key Digest) works well
  - A digest is a small hash of the entire message (like a checksum, but crypto-secure)
  - Sign image off-line one time; all devices can use public key to validate
  - Use per-download encryption as defense in depth
Penetration Testing

“Pen test” – attempt to attack system to look for problems

- Automated vulnerability testing
  - Test known security exploits to see if they succeed
  - Test for bug fixes for known non-exploit vulnerabilities
  - Port scanning for dangerous open (unnecessary) Ethernet ports

- Penetration analysis
  - Hire a “red team” to attempt to penetrate system
  - Fuzz testing – send random inputs to see what breaks
Code Analysis

- Static & dynamic code analysis
  - General code quality tools: Coverity, PC-Lint
  - Security-specific security tools
    - Look for violations of checkable secure coding rules
    - Various tools for thread safety, bounds checking, ...
  - Potential problem:
    - False positives (many warnings are not actual vulnerabilities)

- Peer review
  - Security-oriented review of source code
  - E.g., Cert C 98 Coding Standard
    - E.g., use strcpy_s() instead of strcpy()
Many Other Approaches

- Intrusion detection
  - Detect abnormal patterns of system operation
  - False positives are expensive; no such system is perfect

- Monitor Black Hat sites
  - Look for published exploits against your product

- Honey pot systems
  - Deploy a monitored decoy system and look for successful attacks

- Bug bounties
  - Pay anyone who finds an exploit so you can fix it
Security Mitigation & Validation

Good practices:
- Encourage strong but usable passwords
- Use fine-grain permissions
- Be careful storing password information
- Respect limitations of firewall approaches
- Use secure update and secure boot
- Use more than just penetration testing

Pitfalls:
- Thinking security is easy
- Using intuition instead of doing your homework
Hi, this is your son’s school. We’re having some computer trouble.

Oh, dear — did he break something? In a way —

Did you really name your son Robert? Drop TABLE Students; -- ?

Oh, yes. Little Bobby Tables, we call him.

Well, we’ve lost this year’s student records. I hope you’re happy.

And I hope you’ve learned to sanitize your database inputs.

https://xkcd.com/327/